Abstract The proxy signature, a variant of the ordinary digital signature, has been an active research topic in recent years; it has many useful applications, including distributed systems and grid computing. Although many identity-based proxy signature schemes have been proposed in the literature, only a few proposals for identity-based strong designated verifier proxy signature (ID-SDVPS) schemes are available. However, it has been found that most of the ID-SDVPS schemes that have been proposed to date are not efficient in terms of computation and security, and a computationally efficient and secured ID-SDVPS scheme using elliptic curve bilinear pairing has been proposed in this paper. The security of the scheme is mainly based on the hardness assumption of CDH and GBDH problems in the random oracle model, which is existentially unforgeable against different types of adversaries. Furthermore, the security of our scheme is simulated in the AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) software, a widely used automated internet protocol validation tool, and the simulation results confirm strong security against both active and passive attacks. In addition, because of a high processing capability and supporting additional security features, the scheme is suitable for the environments in which less computational cost with strong security is required.
Introduction
In a PKI (public key infrastructure)-based cryptosystem, the public key certificate that is generated and signed by a certificate authority (CA) is required for authentication of the public keys of the entities, and, as a result, it creates a heavy management burden for maintaining and using the public key certificate by developing a global infrastructure. As a remedy, Shamir (1984) proposed the concept of an identity-based cryptosystem (IBC) that supports the users' authentication through the use of a public identity. In other words, a user's public key in IBC is computed from an email identity, a social security number, a passport number or other identifiers and a private key generator (PKG); a trusted third party generates the user's private key by using the user's identity and his/her master private key. The private key generated by PKG is communicated to the user through a secure channel, for which its legitimacy can be verified by the user publicly. However, as such, no practical implementation for IBC was proposed by Shamir, and in 2001, Boneh and Franklin (2001) first proposed a bilinear pairing-based technique (Weil or Tate) that uses a super-singular elliptic curve based on the Bilinear Diffie Hellman (BDH) assumption in the random oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) , which is called the identitybased encryption (IBE) technique. Subsequently, a number of IBE cryptosystems have been developed. In this paper, we have proposed an identity-based strong designated verifier proxy signature (ID-SDVPS) scheme that uses bilinear pairing for mapping from an elliptic curve additive cyclic group (Miller, 1985; Koblitz, 1987) to any multiplicative cyclic group of the same prime order. Next, the description of some signature schemes will be given.
In 1996, Jakobsson et al. (1996) first proposed a designated verifier signature (DVS) scheme for which the original signer Alice generates a signature, and only a designated verifier Bob can verify the signature. However, it can be seen that the signer's privacy protection is violated in DVS schemes because Bob can easily convince a third party that the message was signed by Alice. To remove this problem, Jakobsson et al. (1996) proposed another signature scheme, called the strong designated verifier signature (SDVS). In an SDVS scheme (Huang et al., 2008; Kang et al., 2009; Islam and Biswas, 2013) , Bob cannot prove to an outsider that Alice is the original signer. This problem occurs because an identical signature can be generated by Bob, and it cannot be distinguished from the signatures of Alice; in addition, Bob's private key is strictly required in the verification phase. Therefore, the SDVS scheme satisfies the strongness and repudiable properties. Since then, many SDVS schemes (Saeednia et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2010; Tang et al., 2011; Yoon, 2011) have been proposed by researchers for different applications of Network/Information Security.
In 1996, Mambo et al. (1996) proposed a proxy signature scheme in which the original signer (Alice) delegated his signing privilege to a proxy signer such that the proxy signer (Bob) on behalf of the original signer can sign some specific messages. An entity (Cindy) who receives a message with a proxy signature can easily check the correctness of the signature and be convinced about the agreement of the original signer. However, this proxy signature scheme allows public verification, which might not be suitable for applications in which the verification of the proxy signature for personal sensitive and/or important commercial documents must be performed by designated persons. Thus, a strong designated verifier proxy signature (SDVPS) scheme (Dai et al., 2003; Wang, 2004; Cao et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2011) is proposed for these environments. In this scheme, the proxy signer computes a proxy signature for the designated verifier, who only validates the signature but is unable to convince an outsider about the original signer and the proxy signer. The reason is that the designated verifier can also generate a simulated proxy signature that is intended for him, which is indistinguishable from the original proxy signature.
Proxy signatures have been suggested for many applications, including distributed systems (Neuman, 1993) , grid computing (Foster et al., 1998) , mobile agent systems , mobile communications (Park and Lee, 2001) , and ecommerce (Dai et al., 2003; Wang, 2004) . Based on the application areas, the proxy signature can be categorized into four types (Mambo et al., 1996; Wang, 2008; Yang, 2010; Islam and Biswas, 2012a) , namely full delegation, partial delegation, delegation by warrant and partial delegation by warrant. Among these, the partial delegation by warrant satisfies all the security requirements of the proxy signatures. Additionally, the proxy signature is based on the proxy private key; the proxy signatures can be classified into two signature types, which are proxy-unprotected and proxy-protected. There is a repudiation dispute problem in the proxy-unprotected scheme because the proxy signature is created either by the original signer or the proxy signer. On the other hand, the repudiation dispute problem is absent in the proxy-protected scheme because only the proxy signer generates the proxy signature.
Recent studies
A number of new identity-based strong designated verifier proxy signature (ID-SDVPS) schemes have been proposed recently (Cao et al., 2005; Lal and Verma, 2006; Kang et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010) , and a short discussion of each is provided here. In 2003, Dai et al. (2003) proposed a designated verifier proxy signature (DVPS) scheme that is suitable for ecommerce environments. In 2005, Cao et al. (2005) proposed an identity-based DVPS (ID-DVPS) scheme that is based on Cha and Cheon's signature scheme (Cha and Cheon, 2003) and uses bilinear pairing, and Gu and Zhu (2005) proposed a new computational model for a provably secure identitybased proxy signature scheme. In 2006, Lal and Verma (2006) proposed an ID-DVPS scheme using bilinear pairings. However, Kang et al. (2009) proved that the scheme was insecure; then, they proposed an efficient scheme and claimed that the scheme was unforgeable. Later, in 2008, Gu and Zhu (2008) proposed an efficient version of Zhang and Kim's scheme (2003) , which was based on the security model proposed in (Gu and Zhu, 2005) . In 2010, Lee et al. (2010) demonstrated that the scheme proposed in (Kang et al., 2009 ) is universally forgeable, which means that anyone can forge a valid ID-DVPS on an arbitrary message without the knowledge of the secret key of either the signer or the designated verifier.
A new proxy signature scheme was also proposed by Wu et al. (2007) , which improves the security aspects of an identity-based proxy signature scheme. Wang (2008) gave a new identity-based proxy signature scheme, which is secure against the proxy key exposure attack in the random oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) . In general, an ID-DVPS scheme needs a trusted PKG unconditionally; otherwise, a dishonest PKG can compute the private key of any user and can forge its proxy signature. In 2010, Yang et al., as a solution of the problem, proposed an ID-DVPS scheme without a trusted party. Later on, Reddy et al. (2010) also proposed an identity-based directed proxy signature scheme using bilinear pairings and the concept of Hess's identity-based signature scheme (Hess, 2002) . In 2012, Islam and Biswas (2012a) proposed an efficient ID-based Short DVPS (ID-ShDVPS) scheme using elliptic curve bilinear pairing, which is a short signature scheme and is applicable to the environments with limited bandwidth, computing power and storage space. However, it always generates the same proxy signature on the same message, and its security is proven only heuristically.
Our contributions
Elliptic curve cryptography and bilinear pairing are two efficient tools that are used to design secure cryptographic protocols for various applications (Zhang and Kim, 2003; Dai et al., 2003; Cao et al., 2005; Farash et al., 2012; Das, 2012) . In the literature, many ID-SDVPS schemes using elliptic curve bilinear pairing have been found. However, the main shortcoming of these schemes is the involvement of high computational cost because many bilinear pairing and pairing-based exponentiation operations are executed for their implementation. Moreover, the security of most of the previous schemes is argued only heuristically; thus, these schemes are prone to security attacks against active adversaries. Therefore, it is necessary to design a provably secure and computationally efficient ID-SDVPS scheme, and in this paper, we proposed such a scheme by using elliptic curve bilinear pairing, where it combines the idea of ID-SDVS schemes proposed in (Huang et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2010; Yoon, 2011) . The schemes (Huang et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2010) are known to be provably secured, i.e., the schemes are existentially unforgeable under the adaptive chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) , based on the intractability of GBDH and BDH assumptions, respectively. However, the main shortcoming of the scheme (Huang et al., 2008) is that it always produces the same signature on the same message. On the other hand, Yoon's ID-SDVS scheme (2011) is efficient with respect to the computations and the communications; however, it is not proven to be provably secured in the random oracle model. Moreover, our scheme has been analyzed using the random oracle model, and it has been found that the scheme is to be existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message and identity attacks based on the hardness assumption of CDH and GBDH assumptions. In addition, we have implemented our proposed ID-SDVPS scheme in the AVISPA software (AVISPA, 2005 (AVISPA, , 2013 , which is a strong simulation tool that is used for the automated security analysis of cryptographic protocols and for formal security verification, and the results obtained through simulation prove it to be strongly secure against active and passive attacks. Additionally, it is computationally efficient because a smaller number of bilinear pairings is involved, and it satisfies all the necessary security requirements.
Organization of the paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some preliminaries that are required in the paper. Section 3 illustrates our ID-SDVPS scheme, and the provable security analysis and formal verification of the scheme are addressed in Section 4. The comparison of our scheme with other schemes is given in Section 5 and the Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the concepts of elliptic curve bilinear pairing, some relevant computational problems, the computational model definition and the security properties of an ID-SDVPS scheme.
Bilinear pairings
Let G q be an additive cyclic group with the prime order q(P2 k , where k is a security parameter), and let G m be another multiplicative group of the same order q. In addition, let e : G q Â G q ! G m be a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
Bilinearity:êðaP ; bQÞ ¼êðP ; QÞ ab for all P, Q 2 G q and a; b2 R Z Ã q . Non-degeneracy: There exists P,Q 2 G q such that eðP ; QÞ -1 m , where 1 m is an identity element of G m . Computability: There is an efficient algorithm that can efficiently computeêðP ; QÞ for all P, Q 2 G q .
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Parameter Generator (BDHPG): A BDHPG G is defined as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that takes the security parameter k as input and outputs a uniformly random tuple ðq;ê; G q ; G m ; PÞ of bilinear parameters.
Complexity assumptions
In this section, we defined some computational problems on the elliptic curve group and bilinear pairings. Several cryptographic schemes have been proposed that are mainly based on the hardness of the following problems, which are assumed to be computationally intractable by any polynomial time bounded algorithm.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem: For any a; b2 R Z Ã q , given (P, aP, bP) belongs to G q , compute abP. Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem: For any a; b; c2 R Z Ã q , given (P, aP, bP, cP) belongs to G q , decide whether c = ab mod q holds. Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem: For any a; b; c2 R Z Ã q , given (P, aP, bP, cP) belongs to G q , computê eðP ; P Þ abc . Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption: If G is a BDH parameter generator, the advantage Adv BDH G;C ðkÞ of an algorithm C for solving the BDH problem is defined to be the probability that the algorithm C outputsêðP ; P Þ abc from the input (G q , G m , e, P, aP, bP, cP), where (G q , G m , e) are the outputs of G for a sufficiently large security parameter k, (P, aP, bP,cP) 2 G q and a; b; c2 R Z Ã q . The BDH assumption is that the advantage Adv BDH G;C ðkÞ is negligible for all the efficient algorithms C. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem: Given a randomly chosen P 2 G q and (aP, bP, cP) 2 G q , where a; b; c2 R Z Ã q and g 2 G m , decide whether g ¼êðP ; P Þ abc holds.
Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) Problem: Given a randomly chosen P 2 G q as well as (aP, bP, cP) 2 G q for any a; b; c2 R Z Ã q , computeêðP ; P Þ abc with the help of the DBDH oracle.
Definition of an ID-SDVPS scheme
In general, an ID-SDVPS scheme comprises four entities, such as the PKG, the original signer, the proxy signer and a designated verifier. The participating entities and their roles in the ID-SDVPS scheme are defined as follows:
Private Key Generator (PKG): The PKG is a trusted authority who is responsible for setting up the system's parameter and generating the private key for all the entities that exist in the system. Original signer: The original signer first defines a warrant and then delegates his signing capability to a proxy signer.
Proxy signer: The proxy signer computes a proxy private key that is based on the original signer's warrant and delegation information. He then signs some messages for the designated verifier on behalf of the original signer. Designated verifier: The designated verifier checks the correctness of the received proxy signature according to the predefined verifying equation and then convince himself about the agreement of the original signer on the signed message.
An ID-SDVPS scheme comprises the following algorithms:
Setup: It takes a security parameter k 2 Z + as input and outputs the system's parameter X and a pair of master private/public key (msk, mpk). Extract: It takes a security parameter k, a system parameter X and the master private key msk as input, and it outputs the valid private/public key pair (S i , Q i ) for an entity ID i . DGen: On input of the system's parameter X, the original signer's private key S i and a warrant m w , the DGen algorithm outputs a valid delegation W for the proxy signer ID j . DVerify: It takes the original signer's public key Q i and a delegation W as input and outputs accept if W is valid; otherwise, it outputs reject. PKGen: Given the proxy signer's private key S j and a delegation W, it outputs a valid proxy private/public key pair (S P , Q P ). PSGen: It takes the proxy private key S P , the delegation W, the designated verifier's public key Q k and a signed message m 2 {0,1}
* as input and generates a proxy signature r for the designated verifier ID k . PSVerify: This algorithm accepts a message m 2 {0,1} * , a warrant W, a signature r, the public key pair (Q i , Q j ) of the original signer and the proxy signer, the designated verifier's private key S k and returns accept if the signature r is valid; otherwise, it returns reject. Transcript simulation: This algorithm takes a message m 2 {0,1} * , a warrant W and the designated verifier's private key S k to generate a simulated proxy signature r 0 , which is identical to the original designated verifier proxy signature r that was generated by the proxy signer.
Security properties of an ID-SDVPS scheme
The ID-SDVPS scheme is expected to satisfy distinguishability, strong verifiability, strong undeniability, strong identifiability, prevention of misuse and strong unforgeability security properties, which are briefly given below: Distinguishability: The designated verifier can distinguish the proxy signature from the original signer's normal signature easily. Strong verifiability: The designated verifier is convinced of the agreement of the original signer on the signed message. Strong undeniability: Once the proxy signer generates a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original signer, however, he cannot deny the signature generation at the later time. Strong identifiability: The identities of the original signer and the proxy signer can be determined by anyone from the proxy signature.
Prevention of misuse:
The proxy private key cannot be used to sign any message, i.e., the proxy signer can sign only those messages that have been approved by the original signer. Strong unforgeability: The original signer and other third parties, except for the designated verifier, cannot generate a valid proxy signature without the proxy private key or the designated verifier's private key.
The proposed ID-SDVPS scheme
In this section, the description of our proposed ID-SDVPS scheme is given. In our scheme, it is assumed that Alice is the original signer and has the identity ID A , Bob is the proxy signer and has the identity ID B and Cindy is the designated verifier and has the identity ID C . We denote them as ID i , where i 2 {A, B, C}, and we consider (Q i , S i ) to be their public/private key pair. As stated earlier, the ideas of the schemes (Huang et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2010; Yoon, 2011) are combined in this paper to construct a new ID-SDVPS scheme that has strong security in the random oracle model and less computational cost, which is described as follows:
Setup: Given a security parameter k 2 Z + , the PKG does the following: (a) Choose an additive cyclic group (G q ,+) of prime order q, a multiplicative group (G m , AE) of the same order q and an admissible bilinear map
Choose a number s2 R Z Ã q and a generator P of G q , and then compute P pub = sP, where (msk, mpk) = (s, sP) is a master private/public key pair of PKG. (c)
Choose three secure and one-way cryptographic hash functions, which are defined as
q; P ; P pub ; H 1 ; H 2 ; H 3 g while keeping the master private key msk = s secret.
Extract: Given an identity ID i , PKG does the following: (a) Compute a private key S i = sQ i and send it to the user ID i through a secure channel, where the user's public key Q i = H 1 (ID i ) is easily computed from ID i by anyone. Note that the hash function H 1 is called the Map-To-Point function, and it converts a random string ID i to an elliptic curve point Q i of the group G q (Boneh and Franklin, 2001; Islam and Biswas, 2012b) . (b) Accordingly, Alice, Bob and Cindy obtain their key pairs (S A , Q A ),(S B , Q B ) and (S C , Q C ) from PKG.
DGen: The original signer Alice creates a warrant m w that keeps the record of the identities of Alice and Bob, the types of messages that Bob can sign, the proxy validity period and so on. Then, Alice chooses a number x2 R Z Ã q and generates the delegation that is based on the signature proposed in (Sun et al., 2010) PKGen: After validating the delegation (R, V), Bob generates the proxy private/public key pair with the help of Alice's delegation and his private key S B , as follows: (a)
The proxy private key is computed as S P = V + hS B . Note that
Then, the proxy public key can be computed as
PSGen: To generate a valid strong designated verifier proxy signature on a given message m 2 {0,1} * , Bob computes the message according to the ID-SDVS schemes proposed in (Huang et al., 2008; Yoon, 2011) Transcript simulation: For a given message m 2 {0,1} * , Cindy uses his/her secret key S C to generate a valid simulated designated verifier proxy signature, as given below: (a)
Choose a numberŷ2 R Z Ã q and compute b T 1 eðŷQ P ; S C Þ.
Then, the simulated signature ðm w ; m; R;ŷ;rÞ is a valid designated verifier proxy signature, and it can be easily verified by the verification equation r ¼ r. The proposed ID-SDVPS scheme is further illustrated in Figure 1 .
Analysis of the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme
In this section, we first check the correctness of the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme, and then, we analyze the scheme formally, using the random oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) and the AVISPA tool (AVISPA, 2005 (AVISPA, , 2013 .
Correctness of the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme
The correctness of the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme is as follows:
(a) Given R = xP, h = H 2 (m w , R) and V = xP pub + hS A , the delegation (R, V) is valid because we havê eðR þ hQ A ; P pub Þ ¼êðxP þ hQ A ; sPÞ ¼êðxsP þ hsQ A ; PÞ ¼êðxP pub þ hS A ; PÞ ¼êðV; PÞ Therefore, the proxy private and public keys S P = V + hS B = sQ P and Q P = R + h(Q A + Q B ) are also valid.
(b) The proxy signature (m w , m, R, r, r) is also correct and consistent because we obtain
Thus, we can have r ¼ H 3 ðm; m w ; TÞ ¼ H 3 ðm; m w ; TÞ ¼ r, and hence, the correctness of the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme is proved.
Security analysis
In this section, we prove that the proposed scheme satisfies all the security properties of an ID-SDVPS scheme, as defined in Cha and Cheon, 2003; Wu et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2011) . We consider the random oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) and show that the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme is strongly unforgeable against all types of adversaries.
Distinguishability:
The proxy signatures generated by the proxy signer are distinguishable by everyone of the normal signatures of the proxy signer. Because the normal signature generated by Bob for Cindy can be verified only by Bob's public key and Cindy's private key, in our proposed scheme, Cindy uses his private key and Bob's proxy public key to verify the validity of the proxy signature (m w , m, R, r, r). Note that the proxy public key (Q P ) is computed by using the public keys of Bob and Alice and other public parameters. Therefore, the verification process of a proxy signature and a normal signature are not identical. Hence, Cindy can distinguish the normal signature from the proxy signature easily. Strong verifiability: The designated verifier Cindy is convinced about the agreement of Alice on the signed message. Now, the received proxy signature (m w , m, R, r, r) is valid if the equation r ¼ r holds. To verify this proxy signature, Cindy computes Q P ¼ R þ hðQ A þ Q B Þ; T ¼êðrQ P ; S C Þ and r ¼ H 3 ðm; m w ; T Þ, which show the requirement of the warrant m w . Thus, Cindy can find Alice's identity from the warrant m w , and Alice's agreement on the signed message is directly understood by Cindy.
Strong undeniability: On behalf of Alice, Bob generates a valid proxy signature for Cindy; however the signature generation at the later time cannot be denied by Bob. In our scheme, Bob generates the proxy signature (m w , m, R, r, r) for Cindy, where, r = H 3 (m, m w , T) and T ¼êðS P ; Q C Þ r , and this signature can be verified by using the verification equation r ¼ r, where T ¼êðrQ P ; S C Þ and r ¼ H 3 ðm; m w ; T Þ. Because the final verification of the proxy signature requires Cindy's private key and Bob's proxy public key, this in turn proves that the signature was created by Bob because he can only compute the proxy signature by using his proxy private key S P , which was created by his private key and Alice's delegation information. Figure 1 The proposed ID-SDVPS scheme.
Strong identifiability: Note that anyone can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer from a valid proxy signature. In our scheme, the delegation information (R, V) is generated by Alice from the warrant m w , which specifies the identities of Alice and Bob, the types of messages that Bob can sign, the validity period and more. Therefore, Cindy, from the warrantm w , can determine the identity of Bob directly. Prevention of misuse: The proxy private key cannot be used to sign other messages; those messages are not authorized by the original signer. In our scheme, Bob cannot sign any messages that have not been authorized by Alice. For this reason, Alice generates a warrant m w that retains the necessary records of the proxy information, such as the identities of Alice and Bob, the restrictions on the messages that Bob can sign, a validity period for the delegation of the signing power and more items of relevance. Therefore, if Bob signs other messages that have not been authorized by Alice, Cindy can detect this action easily by checking the warrant m w . Hence, the property prevention of misuse is achieved in our scheme. Strong unforgeability: On behalf of the original signer, the proxy signer can create a valid proxy signature for the designated verifier, but a proxy signature cannot be generated by the original signer and other third parties, except for the designated verifier. This situation occurs because the outsider does not know either the proxy private key or the private key of the designated verifier. Before discussing the strong unforgeability of our proxy signature scheme in the random oracle model, we first addressed the following types of adversaries that could exist in the system: (a) Type I: The adversary knows only the public keys of Alice and Bob. (b) Type II: The adversary knows only the public keys of Alice and Bob and also knows the private key of Bob. (c) Type III: The adversary knows only the public keys of Alice and Bob and also knows the private key of Alice.
From the above, we can say that, if the proxy signature scheme is unforgeable against Type II and III adversaries, it is also unforgeable against a Type I adversary.
Unforgeability against a Type II adversary
Theorem 1. If there exists a probabilistic polynomial time bounded Type II adversary A II who can break our proposed ID-SDVPS scheme under the adaptively chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model, then there exists an algorithm C that can be used by A II to solve the CDH problem in the elliptic curve group.
Proof. The Type II adversary A II knows the public keys of Alice and Bob and also knows the private key of Bob. The unforgeability of the proposed proxy signature scheme against Type II adversary A II requires that it is difficult to generate a valid delegation without Alice's private key. If A II generates a valid delegation, then he can compute the valid proxy private key easily and a valid strong designated verifier proxy signature as well. We can show that, if there exists an A II who can forge a valid delegation of our scheme, then there exists an algorithm C to solve an instance of the CDH problem.
Thus, C can compute abP for a given random instance (P, aP, bP) 2 G q , where a; b2 R Z Ã q . To solve the CDH problem, C sets (msk, mpk) = (a, aP), Bob's private/public key (S B , P B ) = (acP, cP) and gives (S B , P B ) to A II . Here, P is a generator of G q , and {H 1 , H 2 , H 3 } is considered to be a random oracle. Then, C generates the system's parameter X by running the Setup algorithm and sends it to A II . Next, C answers A II 's queries in the following way: H 1 queries: C maintains a list LH 1 to record the hash queries and the corresponding output. When A II submits a query on ID i to the oracle H 1 , then C looks into LH 1 and responds as
Extract queries: When A II issues an Extract query on ID i , C first makes a query on ID i to the oracle H 1 and recovers Q i from the LH 1 list. Then, C replies to A II as follows:
H 2 queries: Suppose that A II submits an H 2 query on (m w , R i ), C searches the list LH 2 and returns the previous value if such a value is found in LH 2 ; otherwise, C selects an h i 2 R Z Ã q , outputs it as the answer and adds (m w , R i , h i ) to LH 2 .
DGen queries: On receiving a DGen query on the warrant m w with the original signer's identity ID i , C first recovers the values (ID i , Q i ) and (m w , R i , h i ) from LH 1 and LH 2 , respectively, and then performs the following: 
Then, C can solve the CDH problem with the instance (P, aP, bP), as follows:
Unforgeability against a Type III adversary
Theorem 2. The proposed ID-SDVPS scheme is existentially unforgeable against the adaptive chosen message and the identity adversary A III of Type III provided by the GBDH problem is intractable in the elliptic curve group.
Proof. The Type III adversary A III knows the public keys of Alice and Bob and also knows the private key of Alice. Therefore, A III can generate a valid delegation, but not a valid proxy private key because he does not know Bob's private key. Thus, A III attempts to generate a valid proxy signature without the proxy private key or the private key of Cindy. We now show that, if A III can generate a forged proxy signature, then there must exist an algorithm C that can use A III to solve an instance of a GBDH problem.Thus, for a given random instance (P, aP, bP, cP) 2 G q , where a; b; c2 R Z Ã q , C can competeêðP; PÞ abc with the help of the DBDH oracle. To solve a GBDH problem, C sets (msk, mpk) = (a, aP), S A = aa 0 P, Q A = a 0 P, Q B = aP and Q C = bP, and sends (Q A , Q B , Q C , Q P , S A ) to A III , where a 0 ; a; b; c 2 R Z Ã q . Next, C generates the system's parameter X by running the Setup algorithm and sends it to A III and answers A III 's queries, as follows: H 1 queries: In this case, A III can ask at most q H1 times H 1 hash queries, and C maintains a list LH 1 to record the hash queries and the corresponding outputs. When A III submits a query ID i to the oracle H 1 , then C looks into the list LH 1 and responds as follows:
Extract queries: In this case, A III can ask at most q e Extract queries. When A III submits an Extract query on ID i , C recovers the tuple (ID i , Q i ) from LH 1 and then responds as follows:
H 2 queries: In this case, A III can ask at most q H2 times H 2 hash queries. When receiving an H 2 query on (m w , R i ), C first searches the list LH 2 and returns the old value defined in LH 2 if such a value is found. Otherwise, C selects h i 2 R Z Ã q , sets H 2 (m w , R i ) = h i and includes the tuple (m w , R i , h i ) into the list LH 2 .
DGen queries: In this case, A III can ask at most q d times DGen queries. Assume that A III makes a DGen query to C on the warrant m w with the original signer's identity ID i . Here, C knows the original signer's private/public key pair (S A = aa 0 P, Q A = a 0 P), and then C executes DGen queries on (ID i , m w ) to compute the corresponding delegation (R i , V i ). PKGen queries: When A III queries a PKGen of the proxy signer for m w , C computes the private key S j = r j aP of the proxy signer, the proxy private key S Pj = V i + h i S j and A responds to A III with S Pj .
H 3 queries: The adversary A III is allowed to ask at most q H3 times H 3 hash queries, and C maintains an H 3 oracle list LH 3 that contains the tuples of the form (m i , t i , r i , coin i ). Here, (m i , t i ) and r i are the input and output, respectively. Next, if
PÞ abc holds, then coin i = 1; otherwise, coin i = 0. On receiving an H 3 query on
aP; bP; cPÞ to the DBDH oracle, which informs C whether t i ÁêðV i þ h i S j ; Q k Þ 1=hi ÁêðV i ; ÀQ k Þ 1=hi ¼êðP; PÞ abc holds and performs the following:
holds, then C sets coin i = 1 and looks into the list LH 3 and produces the following: (i) If a tuple of the form (m i ,^, r i ,1) is found in LH 3 , then C outputs r i . (ii) Otherwise, C chooses r i 2 R Z Ã q such that there is no tuple of the form (AE, AE, r i , AE) in LH 3 and inserts (m i , t i , r i ,1) into LH 3 and returns r i as the output.
coin i = 0 and chooses r i 2 R Z Ã q such that there is no tuple of the form (AE, AE, r i , AE) in the list LH 3 ; then, C inserts (m i , t i , r i , 0) into LH 3 and returns r i as the output.
PSGen queries:
The adversary A III is allowed to ask at most q s times PSGen queries. Suppose that A III selects a message m i and then submits a PSGen query to C on m i . Then, C performs the following: Recently, the automated security validation tool for internet protocols and its applications have become widely employed in many cryptographic protocols, to analyze security systems formally. In the literature, many such tools have been found, and AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) (Oheimb, 2005; AVISPA, 2013 ) is one of the commonly used automated security validation tools (Farashei al., 2012; Basu et al., 2012; Das, 2012; Das et al., 2013) . AVISPA is a push-button tool that was developed based on the Dolev-Yao intruder model (Dolev and Yao, 1983) for the automated validation of cryptographic protocols. In this model, an intruder has full control over the network, i.e., all the messages sent by principals go to the intruder, who can forward, modify, replay, suppress and synthesize them and can send them anywhere. In addition, an intruder can play the roles of the legitimate principals and can gain knowledge of the compromised principals; however, he cannot break the cryptography. The AVISPA tool has a modular and expressive formal language, called HLPSL (High Level Protocol Figure 3 Role specification of the original signer (Alice) in HLPSL language. Specification Language), which is used for implementing the protocols and analysis of various security properties such as secrecy of keys, authentication, freshness and robustness against replay attacks. In addition, the AVISPA tool supports four back-ends/model checkers (See Figure 2) , namely OFMC (On-the-fly Model-Checker), CL-AtSe (Constraint-Logicbased Attack Searcher), SATMC (SAT-based Model-Checker) and TA4SP (Tree Automata-based Protocol Analyzer) (AVI-SPA, 2005) , each of which is briefly described below:
OFMC: This back-end builds the infinite tree defined by the protocol analysis problem and executes different symbolic techniques to search the state space in a demand-driven way, i.e., on-the-fly. OFMC helps to detect attacks and verify the correctness of the protocol for a bounded number of sessions, but without limiting the number of messages that an intruder can generate. CL-AtSe: This back-end is used to detect the attacks on the protocol by using a set of constraints that are obtained by translating the security protocol specification written in Intermediate Format (IF). The detection of attacks and the translation of protocol specifications, which are designed based on the adversary's knowledge, are fully automated and are internally performed by the CL-AtSe model checker. SATMC: This back end is used to explore the state space through several symbolic techniques. Note that it also detects attacks on protocols and validates the security requirements by using a bounded number of sessions. TA4SP: Based on the propositional formulae and regular tree languages, this back-end approximates the intruder knowledge (over or under), using the unbounded number of sessions.
To analyze a cryptographic protocol with the AVISPA tool, the following steps must be executed:
Step 1. The protocol is to be coded in the HLPSL specification, which is a role-based language that helps to describe each participant's role and the composition roles for the representation of the scenarios of the basic roles.
Step 2. Using the translator HLPSL2IF, the HLPSL code is to be translated into IF, which contains some information about IF syntax for back-ends, the description of mathematical properties of Figure 4 Role specification of the proxy signer (Bob) in HLPSL language.
operators (e.g., exponentiation, bit-wise XOR, etc.) and the intruder's behavior.
Step 3. Finally, the IF specification is given to the back-ends of the AVISPA tool to analyze whether there are any active or passive attacks.
To validate and examine the security properties of our ID-SDVPS scheme, we implemented it using the HLPSL language in the AVISPA tool, and the role specifications of the original signer (Alice), the proxy signer (Bob) and the designated verifier (Cindy) are given in Figs. 3-5. We have simulated our scheme using SPAN (Security Protocol ANimator) for AVI-SPA. The proposed scheme is analyzed in the OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends, and the results are shown in Figs. 6 and 7. From these simulation results, the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme indeed shows its strong security assurance against both passive and active attacks.
Efficiency analysis
In this section, we compare the efficiency of the proposed scheme with other schemes that were proposed in (Cao et al., 2005; Kang et al., 2009; Yang, 2010; Lee et al., 2010; Reddy et al., 2010) . In our comparison, the following three time complexities for the different computations mentioned are used. To generate the proxy signature, the proxy signer computes T ¼êðS P ; Q C Þ a priori, and hence, the time complexi- Figure 5 Role specification of the designated verifier (Cindy) in HLPSL language. Figure 6 Results of the formal security analysis of the proposed scheme using OFMC back-end. Figure 7 Results of the formal security analysis of the proposed scheme using CL-AtSe back-end. ties of the proposed scheme actually result from the execution of six elliptic curve scalar point multiplications, three bilinear pairings and one pairing-based exponentiation operation. In Table 1 , we compare the efficiency of the proposed scheme with other schemes based on the computation cost, the communication cost (length of the signature) and the security, which show that our scheme is more computation and communication efficient than others (Cao et al., 2005; Kang et al., 2009; Yang, 2010; Lee et al., 2010; Reddy et al., 2010) . In addition, it has been found that the proposed scheme is unforgeable against active and passive attacks and is provably secure under the adaptively chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model based on CDH and GBDH assumptions.
Conclusions
Recently, elliptic curve cryptography and bilinear pairing have been extensively used to design different secure and efficient schemes for a variety of applications. Several ID-SDVPS schemes based on elliptic curve bilinear pairing have been proposed in recent years; however, they are neither secure against different attacks nor computationally efficient. In this paper, we proposed an efficient ID-SDVPS scheme, which is demonstrated to be provably secure with the hardness assumption of CDH and GBDH problems in the random oracle model against an adaptive chosen message and identity attacks under the different types of adversaries. Additionally, the formal validation of the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme is performed by using an automated validation tool called AVISPA, and the simulation results show that the scheme is unforgeable against active and passive adversaries. Compared with other existing schemes, the proposed scheme also provides better computation and communication efficiencies and, thus, is suitable for real-life applications. 
